INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom assumes that police are in charge of their investigative tools. However, the fact that police are now consumers of new surveillance technologies created and sold by private companies calls this assumption into question. 1 Through different mechanisms intended to promote their own interests and profits, these companies exert control over the police long after their products have been adopted. Private surveillance technology companies wield an undue influence over public police today in ways that aren't widely acknowledged, but have enormous consequences for civil liberties and police oversight.
This undue influence can take many forms. The police may be prevented by contract from disclosing information they are supposed to and otherwise would disclose to criminal defendants, judges, journalists, and the public. In addition, a monopoly (or near monopoly) in the market for a particular technology means that a local police department often must accept the design choices and costs of a single company when it acquires and uses a surveillance product. Finally, aggressive assertions of secrecy about proprietary information may mean that the press, the courts, and the public have no access to the technology shaping substantive decisions about who should be subjected to police attention.
The relationships between surveillance technology vendors and police departments show the increasing degree to which private companies can guide, shape, and limit what the public police do. That police rely on private vendors is unremarkable as a general proposition. The police, like other complex organizations, necessarily rely on vendors for everything from uniforms to bulletproof vests. This consumer-vendor relationship, however, poses greater concerns when the product itself is central to the development of the governmental suspicion that underlies so many enforcement decisions. While scholars have recognized the role of federal funding in local police surveillance programs, 2 the role of private technology vendors has gone largely unnoticed. Yet any vision of increased police accountability today cannot be complete without consideration of the role the surveillance technology produced by these companies plays in policing, and whether the policing decisions embedded in such technology are also subject to public accountability.
The typical approach to the use of new police technologies involves the oversight of courts, legislatures, and local government bodies through judicial opinions, statutes, and local ordinances. The Supreme Court has weighed in, for example, on the police use of manned overhead surveillance, 3 thermal imaging devices, 4 and GPS trackers. 5 Congress and state legislatures have created legal standards for investigative techniques like electronic eavesdropping. 6 Cities and counties can oversee local law enforcement agencies through budgetary decisions. 7 When private companies influence policing through their role as vendors, however, the usual mechanisms of oversight do not easily apply; they have little obligation to permit public access, and the usual constitutional constraints over the police do not regulate them at all. 8 In this Essay, I identify three recent examples in which surveillance technology companies have exercised undue influence over policing: stingray cellphone surveillance, body cameras, and big data programs. By undue influence I mean the commercial self-interest of surveillance technology vendors that overrides principles of accountability and transparency normally governing the police. I then examine the harms that ensue when this influence goes unchecked, and suggest some means by which oversight can be imposed on these relationships. 3 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) . 4 2017), https://www.aclu.org/files/communitycontrol/ACLU-Local-Surveillance-Technology-ModelCity-Council-Bill-January-2017.pdf (requiring any "municipal entity" to obtain city approval before seeking, acquiring, or borrowing new surveillance technology). 8 See infra Section II.
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A. Stingray Cellphone Surveillance and Nondisclosure Agreements
Stingrays, as they are commonly known, refer to cell-site simulators, 9 a type of surveillance equipment that had been used by dozens of police departments-until recently-with little public knowledge. The secrecy surrounding police use of stingrays is attributable largely to the Harris Corporation. Harris dominates the market for stingrays used by the police, so much so that one of its products, the Stingray, has become eponymous with the technology itself. 10 Stingray devices work by behaving as fake cellphone towers. 11 About the size of a suitcase, the devices are mobile and can be operated from a police car, carried by hand, or even mounted on airplanes. 12 Stingrays collect information by exploiting cellphone vulnerabilities. Cellphones send out signals seeking the closest cell site-usually located on a towerapproximately every seven seconds, whether the user is making a call or not. 13 Because a stingray mimics a legitimate cellphone tower antenna, it forces all nearby phones within its range to provide it with identifying information. 14 Depending on the individual model, a stingray device can 10 Harris is also the manufacturer of other cell-site simulator models like TriggerFish, KingFish, and Hailstorm, but the term "stingray" has become a standard term in journalism and scholarship. See Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines That Steal Your Phone's Data, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-themachines-that-steal-your-phones-data/. 11 See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Feds Admit Stingrays Can Disrupt Cell Service of Bystanders, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2015, 4:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admit-stingrays-candisrupt-cell-service-bystanders/ ("Stingrays are mobile surveillance systems the size of a small briefcase that impersonate a legitimate cell phone tower in order to trick mobile phones and other mobile devices in their vicinity into connecting to them and revealing their unique ID and location."). Stingrays can be used either to identify 1) the hardware numbers of cellphones in a particular location or 2) the precise location of a cellphone associated with a number the police already know. identify in real time all nearby phones, pinpoint their location with a high degree of accuracy, and even block service to nearby devices. 15 In cases where stingray use has been revealed, the police have sought either the unique serial numbers associated with all of the cellphones in a particular location, or the location of a phone whose serial number the officers already knew. 16 These cases of cellphone surveillance are different from instances in which the police have asked wireless carriers like Sprint or Verizon for an individual's historical cell site information. In recent appellate decisions like United States v. Graham and United States v. Davis, the police sought historical records from cellphone service providers about the connectionssometimes thousands of data points-individual subscribers had made with cellphone towers. In those cases, courts-relying on the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine-have largely ruled in favor of the government's ability to request that information without a warrant. 17 By contrast, a stingray device allows the police to collect real time, not historical, cell-site location information on their own, without relying on help from wireless carrier companies. 18
Nondisclosure Agreements
Dozens of local police departments as well as the FBI have drawn criticism because of the intense secrecy surrounding their use of stingrays. 19 Beginning in 2011, journalists, civil liberties groups, and defense attorneys uncovered numerous examples in which police departments in the United States used stingray devices in criminal investigations. 20 In many cases, no ( one outside of the police departments involved was officially notified that the police were intercepting information with stingrays. 21 The Harris Corporation, the primary manufacturer of stingray devices, 22 has played a large role in this secrecy. In order to provide its stingray devices to local police departments, Harris needed regulatory approval of its products from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 23 When Harris applied to the FCC for certification of its stingray devices in 2010, it requested that all information about stingrays be treated "as confidential and be withheld from public inspection." 24 To justify its request for confidentiality, Harris cited both its need to protect its proprietary information from competitors, and the alleged need to prevent criminals from learning about and circumventing law enforcement surveillance technology. 25 The FCC ultimately granted two specific conditions requested by Harris for its equipment authorization grant:
1) "The marketing and sale of these devices shall be limited to federal, state, local public safety and law enforcement officials only;" and 2) "State and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate with the FBI the acquisition and use of the equipment authorized under this authorization." 26 In practice, these conditions have meant that local law enforcement agencies must abide by nondisclosure agreements, often overseen by the FBI, to use or acquire stingray equipment. 27 The results of numerous public records requests filed by journalists and others confirm that police departments around the country have entered into similarly worded WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011) (describing stingray as "one of several new technologies used by law enforcement to track people's locations, often without a search warrant") (emphasis added). 21 See infra Section I.A.3. 22 See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 20 (noting that the "best known stingray maker is Florida-based defense contractor Harris Corp"). 23 nondisclosure agreements about stingrays. 28 These nondisclosure agreements impose strict conditions of secrecy on law enforcement agencies that intend to use stingrays. 29 For example, the nondisclosure agreement agreed to by the Baltimore Police Department in 2011 to use a Harris Stingray imposed the following conditions: 30 An agreement not to "distribute, disseminate, or otherwise disclose any information" regarding stingray technology "without the prior written approval of the FBI."
An agreement not to, "in any civil or criminal proceeding, use or provide any information concerning the Harris Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology" without "prior written approval of the FBI."
An agreement to, "at the request of the FBI, seek dismissal of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing others to use or provide, any information concerning the Harris Corporation" stingray technology.
Similarly, in the 2010 nondisclosure agreement the city of Tucson, Arizona, signed with Harris, the city agreed not to "discuss, publish, release or disclose any information pertaining [to stingrays] . . . without the prior written consent of Harris." 31 The nondisclosure agreements of Tucson and Baltimore are representative of others entered into by police departments around the country. 32 Requests by courts and journalists to determine whether police departments have acquired or used stingray technology have frequently met resistance from police departments relying on the terms of these nondisclosure agreements. , http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-charles-woman-withdraws-guilty-pleain-case-linked-to/article_70d5ae28-e819-59d8-a391-78fdd4602d9f.html. 34 Id.
35 When charges were dropped against her three co-defendants, Wilqueda Lillard withdrew her guilty plea on the basis that the use of stingray surveillance had not been disclosed in her case. physical entry of a home, the Court held that the warrantless use of such a device violated Kyllo's Fourth Amendment rights. 40 Similarly, police use of a stingray device aimed at a home or apartment building in order to determine whether a particular user's cellphone (and the user) was inside may be a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant and probable cause. Second, the use of a device to force a person's cellphone to provide the police with precise locational data-in some cases within two meters of the cellphone-echoes similar legal debates about whether the Fourth Amendment governs the government's collection of vast amounts of locational data, even in public spaces. That issue was raised, but not decided, in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Jones v. United States. In Jones, the Court considered whether the government's warrantless collection of twenty-eight days' worth of GPS locational data amounted to a Fourth Amendment search. 41 The majority in Jones concluded that it did, but reached this conclusion in a way that did not directly address the collection of the data itself. Rather, the majority focused on the warrantless physical installation of the GPS receiver on the defendant's car and found that this interference with Jones's property rights amounted to a Fourth Amendment search. 42 Five justices, however, in concurring opinions, seem to have approved of what has sometimes been called the "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment. 43 The mosaic theory argues that while any one governmental act of information collection may not be a search under the Fourth Amendment, the totality of these actions might be. Thus, while the observation of a single trip may not be regulated by the Fourth Amendment, prolonged government observation of a person's movements would reveal much more information about a person and ought to be considered a search. The D.C. Circuit, in deciding Jones's case before it reached the Supreme Court, explicitly embraced the mosaic theory in holding the GPS monitoring was a search. 44 40 Id. at 40 (holding that when the Government uses a device to explore details of a home that are otherwise unknowable in the absence of physical intrusion, the surveillance constitutes a search); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (monitoring of a beeper taken into a private residence was a Fourth Amendment search).
41 565 U.S. 400, 402-03 (2012). 42 Id. at 404 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search.'"). 43 See, Orin Kerr, What's the Status of the Mosaic Theory After Jones?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/23/whats-the-status-of-themosaic-theory-after-jones/ ("And perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the Jones opinions is that there appears to be a majority ready to embrace the mosaic theory, at least in some form."). 44 Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Jones, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, does not refer explicitly to the mosaic theory, but it does state that "use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy." 45 Justice Sotomayor, in a separate concurrence, agreed that Jones's case could be resolved by the majority's trespass-based focus, yet she also agreed with Justice Alito that "at the very least" long term GPS monitoring would impinge on reasonable expectations of privacy. 46 Justice Sotomayor went on to explain that she would "take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public movements." 47 Similar concerns about how to view the aggregation of data collected by the government have been raised in cases of historical cell-site location data. 48 In these cases, the government, in trying to trace a person's whereabouts, has obtained from wireless carrier companies the information that shows where and when the person's cellphone was in contact with cellphone tower antennae. The resulting data constitutes a time machine of sorts that traces the person's location over a period of time. From the government's perspective, the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine provides no Fourth Amendment protection to such data held by wireless carriers; 49 the only legal requirement is a showing that the data would be "relevant" under the Federal Stored Communications Act. 50 constructively even though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more-sometimes a great deal more-than does the sum of its parts." 45 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 46 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 47 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 48 
Secret Stingray Use
Whether or not police use of stingrays are Fourth Amendment searches requiring warrants and probable cause is impossible to determine if judges and defense attorneys are unware of their use. In many criminal proceedings in which stingray use was suspected or later confirmed, police did not seek warrants for their use. 51 In some cases, police applied for a pen register order, without disclosing that the police had used a stingray device. 52 Orders granted under the Federal Pen Register Act are not warrants. Under that law, a court "shall" grant an application for an order if the government has demonstrated that "the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 53 In at least one other instance, police maintained secrecy about stingray use through misleading description. In 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Florida uncovered an email exchange between two local police departments suggesting a policy of describing stingrays as confidential informants. An exchange between the Sarasota and North Point, Florida, police departments showed that the departments had borrowed a stingray device from the U.S. Marshals Service, which requested secrecy about the use of the device. The email instructed that in reports, "we simply refer to the assistance as 'received information from a confidential source regarding the location of the suspect.'" 54 At the federal level, widespread attention and criticism of stingray secrecy ultimately resulted in a change in FBI policy. In September 2015, the Department of Justice announced new guidelines for FBI use of stingrays. 55 The guidelines specify that law enforcement agencies must seek a warrant based upon probable cause as required by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Procedure, with exceptions for exigent circumstances where seeking a warrant is not practicable. 56 The policy also applies in 51 See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 127 So. 3d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that the police "did not want to obtain a search warrant because they did not want to reveal information about the technology they used to track the cell phone signal"). 52 
B. Cornering the Market on Police Body Cameras
As consumers of surveillance products, police departments choose from what the market has to offer. When one or two companies dominate a surveillance technology market, their product-design choices can determine how police departments use the technology.
Body cameras are a perfect example. When the 2014 fatal shooting of an unarmed African-American teenager by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, drew widespread protests and nationwide attention to fatal encounters with the police, public attention focused on the use of police body cameras as a means of promoting police accountability. 59 After a grand jury declined to indict officer Darren Wilson for Michael Brown's death, Brown's family called for "every police officer working the streets in this country" to wear a body camera. 60 While body cameras had been used by some departments prior to 2014, 61 police departments around the country struggling to respond to concerns about transparency and accountability rushed to purchase them Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-sitesimulators. 57 63 According to a 2015 survey, almost ninety-five percent of police and sheriff's departments in major American cities and counties had plans to adopt or had adopted body cameras. 64 The basics of a body camera appear simple enough: It is worn by a police officer, and it records video. In practice, however, police departments that adopt body cameras must address complex issues about data production, storage, and access. 65 The data production questions, for instance, involve when and in what circumstances body cameras can or must be turned on or off. For instance, should police officers turn on their body cameras in every interaction with the public? Should an officer accede to a request to turn a camera off? Should police have individual discretion to turn their body cameras off-such as when informants or sexual assault victims are involved-and if so, when? The answers to these questions determine not only how the resulting video is produced, but whether it is produced at all.
When Product Design Is Policy
Questions that appear to be about policy are also often questions of design. A camera that alerts the public when it records incorporates a form of visceral notice; 66 a camera with a "stealth mode" permits surreptitious recording by the police. 67 decision to record can be left to a supervisor, 68 a choice which may preserve more data but increase resentment by line officers. If a camera has a "buffer" that has several seconds of recording preserved before an officer turns the camera on, then that design choice might assuage concerns about police discretion, mistakes, and dishonesty. Video data, once recorded, also needs to be stored in a way that complies with standards of evidence preservation and data security.
Market Dominance
In the marketplace for body cameras, most of these choices are left to one company, Taser International. Previously associated with electronic stun guns, Taser has become the dominant company in police body camera manufacturing, responsible for three-quarters of the body camera market in the United States. 69 Many of the largest police departments around the country, including those in Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Dallas, Baltimore, and Las Vegas, have signed contracts with Taser. 70 Through its Axon brand, Taser sells several different types of cameras, including the Axon Flex, which is designed to attach to glasses or a shirt collar and records an officer's eye-level view. 71 Taser's market dominance can be attributed to two factors. First, it is Taser's cloud-management service, rather than its body cameras, that ensures long-term contracts with police departments. Body cameras generate a huge quantity of data that must be stored somewhere. Many police departments lack the technical capacity or skills to store data securely themselves. Taser offers police departments subscriptions to its cloud storage service for body-camera video with its subsidiary, Evidence.com. 72 For the police, Taser offers a full-service system: both cameras and profound effect on how the cameras are used and who benefits from them"). 68 See data storage. As one investor stated, "Taser wants to be the Tesla or Apple of law enforcement." 73 Indeed, the data storage service has proven far more profitable for Taser than the cameras themselves, "low-margin hunks of plastic designed to get police departments using the real moneymaker." 74 While police departments do not buy new body cameras every year, cloud services have recurring charges. 75 For instance, Taser's cameras purchased by the Birmingham, Alabama, police in 2015 cost about $180,000, but the department's entire five-year contract, including data storage and management, is $889,000. 76 Second, Taser holds a distinct advantage over other body-camera companies because of its existing dominance in the electric stun-gun market. When police departments purchase electric stun guns, they are almost always Taser brand products. Until 2014, stun guns were the main source of Taser's profitability. 77 By 2015, year-over-year revenue from Taser's Axon unit nearly doubled compared to the previous year. 78 Because of its stun-gun business, Taser claims to have relationships with 17,000 of the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States. 79 Those relationships also make it easier for Taser to persuade police departments to avoid competitive bidding processes and choose Axon cameras. Taser representatives emailed police officials in Richmond, Virginia, for example, and urged them to rely upon exemptions to the state's procurement bidding process. One Taser representative wrote, "I've recently read through the State's Procurement Guide relating to noncompetitive purchases . . . . I see this can be used for a purchase when 'there is only one source practicably available for the goods or services required.'" 80 In December 2015, the Richmond Police Department signed a no-bid contract worth $2.4 million with Taser. 81 Reporters have uncovered similar instances of Taser actively courting police departments to sign nobid contracts. 82 Taser intends to influence the future design and use of police body 73 See Weise, supra note 71. 74 cameras as well. 83 The company's CEO and co-founder, Rick Smith, expects Taser's body cameras will incorporate facial-recognition technology so officers can "query police records or social networks in real time." 84 While other smaller companies continue to develop alternative products and win contracts-most notably with the NYPD, the nation's largest police force 85 -the body-camera company most police departments will rely upon is Taser. Taser will likely only strengthen its position in the body camera market after announcing in April 2017 that it would offer every police department in the country free body cameras, support software, and data storage for one year. 86 In addition, the company announced it would change its corporate name from Taser to Axon to reflect its emphasis on body cameras and their related technologies. 87 Finally, the promise of body cameras-to increase police accountability and to deter misconduct-has only been partially realized. A technology by itself does not provide accountability; the policies behind it do. 88 Around the country, police have rushed to adopt body cameras, sometimes with few guidelines in place regarding issues such as when cameras should be used, when they can be turned off, how long data can be retained, and who may have access to it. Likewise, state legislatures have 83 See, e.g., Weise, supra note 71 ("Cop cams are inextricably tied to Taser, by far the dominant supplier, and the company will likely shape whatever the devices evolve into."). 84 Id. https://www.cnet.com/news/police-free-body-cameras-artificial-intelligence-taser-axonvievu/ (noting that the offer includes "body cameras for up to one year, along with software, storage, training and tech support for the equipment"). 87 been slow to clarify how body camera video may be released under state public records laws. As a result, police body cameras have become poorly regulated all-purpose surveillance tools. 89 
C. Big Data Software and Proprietary Information
Like companies selling stingrays and body cameras, vendors that sell police big data software can influence policing in ways that often go unnoticed. The term "big data" generally refers to the application of computer algorithms to very large sets of data, 90 such as the technology that drives predictions on Amazon, Tinder, and Netflix as well as decisions about credit card applications, loan approvals, financial fraud, and airport screening. For an increasing number of police departments, the tools of prediction are useful for helping the police identify suspicious persons and places. 91 Predictive policing programs suggest geographic areas where police should focus their enforcement attention. 92 Network analysis can help police identify which persons might be at heightened risk of violent victimization or aggression. 93 Threat analysis software can assign a score to warn a police officer of any potential danger posed in a street encounter or traffic stop. 94 These algorithmically determined judgments about suspicion can be 89 See , 2016) , https://nyti.ms/1s4fQfh (describing the use by Chicago police of its "heat list," a computer algorithm that "assigns scores based on arrests, shootings, affiliations with gang members and other variables . . . to predict who is most likely to be shot soon or to shoot someone"). 94 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, A Police Department's Secret Formula for Judging Danger, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/a-policedepartments-secret-formula-for-judging-danger/423642 (describing how with Intrado's Beware software, "a city that gets a 911 call about a known individual or address can plug that information into a proprietary search function and get a 'threat assessment' based on publicly available data").
biased or error-laden. In some cases, the raw inputs used by an algorithm can reflect biased human decisions that in turn help produce a biased result. 95 For instance, arrests-particularly for minor offenses-are the products of police discretion, which may in turn be influenced by legitimate determinations, like resource constraints, and illegitimate ones, like racial bias. If a predictive policing program relies heavily on past arrests as a factor in determining future suspicion, then any resulting prediction about where police should go in the future may be nothing more than a reflection of where they have been in the past. 96 Similar questions might be raised about programs that sift through social media posts. Threat assessments may take into account inputs of dubious value-like posts critical of the police-that then produce results that themselves merit skepticism. 97 In addition, legal scholars have raised questions about whether the existing legal system-traditionally premised upon humans making the judgments-can adapt to automated decision making. 98 The good news is that many computer scientists and legal scholars recognize both the value and feasibility of making "black box" 99 algorithms used in legal decisions more accountable. 100 The automated decision making of algorithms can be assessed beforehand to see if their processes are consistent, fair, and adequate. Alternatively, we might examine these processes afterwards to see if their results comport with legal and policy norms. In theory, algorithms in policing, sentencing, bail, and other criminal justice areas may represent an improvement on traditional methods of assessment: human beings alone.
The bad news is that the information necessary to make these 95 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016) ("Approached without care, data mining can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society."). 96 See Joh, supra note 91, at 58 (discussing the problem of using human discretionary judgments as inputs in big data programs). 97 evaluations is often locked behind private doors. Though police departments may rely increasingly on big data tools, they do not create them. The police are customers who contract with private vendors. A police department looking for big data tools to predict crime or assess threats will turn to products like PredPol, Beware, Geofeedia, or DigitalStakeout. When police departments agree to purchase or contract for big data tools, they typically bargain for the results, but not the proprietary algorithms that produce them. PredPol, whose software relies upon inputted data to produce 500-foot square boxes on a map of a city to direct police where future crime is likely to occur, is well known for keeping its algorithm a "closely guarded" secret. 101 The same is true of Intrado's Beware, the software that analyzes billions of data points, including property records, commercial databases, recent purchases, and social media posts, to assign threat scores for people in a matter of seconds. 102 A person encountered in a traffic stop or service call and assigned a high threat score by the software will warrant extra caution on the part of the police. How the software arrives at any particular score, however, is not known to the public or even to the police because Intrado considers its algorithms a trade secret. 103 In other cases, surveillance technology vendors may ban access to the data they produce for the police. The technology used in ShotSpotter, employed in at least ninety cities, 104 is able to identify the location of a gunshot within eighty feet of its discharge and report that data to the police. 105 The ShotSpotter company, however, considers the resulting data proprietary information that is unavailable to the public. 106 The company's CEO described distribution of its data through public records requests as akin to "taking someone else's Netflix subscription." 107 While ShotSpotter offers gunshot data for sale to its government customers, few cities have chosen that option. That choice may be attributable in part to confusion on the part of police departments as to what data they do and do not own in their ShotSpotter contract. 108 These private lock-in effects may linger even after a police department terminates a contract with a vendor. Since at least 2012, Palantir has provided the NYPD with software that analyzes criminal justice data and highlights connections between people and crimes. When the NYPD decided to cancel its contract with Palantir in 2017 and requested a copy of Palantir's analysis to transfer to its new software system, Palantir provided the information-but without a translation key. Giving NYPD the means to translate Palantir's earlier software analysis, the company argued, would compromise its intellectual property rights. 109 
II THE HARMS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
The use of nondisclosure agreements, the ability to dominate a particular market, and the shielding of proprietary information all share a common feature: They exert an undue influence by private companies on public police practices. That influence can and has resulted in real harms that affect legal change, police oversight, and police accountability.
A. Fourth Amendment Distortion
First, the undue influence of surveillance technology companies can distort or hinder the development of Fourth Amendment law. When new surveillance technologies are kept secret because of nondisclosure agreements, they cannot be challenged by criminal defendants and those challenges can't be decided by judges-whatever the merits of the defendants' claims. The use of a new surveillance technology may or may not be considered a Fourth Amendment search, but a private company's insistence on secrecy removes the legal issue from judicial review.
That pattern fits the secrecy around the use of stingray devices and the subsequent discovery by reporters and civil liberties groups that these devices were being used by police. In a number of recent cases, police departments used stingrays and either did not seek any judicial authorization at all, or chose not to seek a warrant and applied for a "trap and trace" order with no indication that a new technology would be 108 See id. 
employed.
The 2016 opinion in State v. Andrews, 110 from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, illustrates how deliberate secrecy about a surveillance technology can hinder Fourth Amendment law. In 2014, Baltimore police used Hailstorm, a cell-site simulator also sold by the Harris Corporation, to locate Kerron Andrews, a suspect in an attempted murder. By forcing Andrews's phone to connect with their stingray, the Baltimore police located Andrews, who was sitting inside a residence in Baltimore City. 111 Andrews argued that the evidence later found at the apartment should be suppressed because it was discovered as a result of police use of a stingray without a warrant. 112 The Andrews court ultimately decided that the police should have obtained a warrant for their stingray use because it intruded upon Andrews's reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 113 In trying to locate Andrews, the police did not apply for a warrant, but they did apply for and were granted a pen register/trap and trace order. 114 By deciding that individuals have Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their real-time cellphone location information, the Andrews court held that the evidence found because of the Hailstorm's use had to be suppressed.
In deciding in Andrews's favor, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals heavily criticized the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) for its secret stingray use. The BPD application for the pen register order nowhere specified that the police would be using a stingray. Indeed, such a disclosure was prohibited by the nondisclosure agreement entered into by the Baltimore State's Attorney and the FBI as a condition imposed on the BPD in order to purchase Harris Corporation stingrays. The terms of the Baltimore nondisclosure agreement prohibited the police from revealing information about their stingray in any "press release, in court documents, during judicial hearings, or during other public forums or proceedings." 115 Such secrecy, according to the Andrews court, "obstructs the court's ability to make the necessary constitutional appraisal." 116 In determining whether a search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred, a "court must understand why and how the search is to be conducted," including "the functionality of the surveillance device and the range of information 110 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 111 Id. at 328-29. 112 Id. at 330. 113 Id. at 327. 114 Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-4B-01 to 05 (West)). 115 Id. at 338. 116 Id. at 339. potentially revealed by its use." 117 By choosing compliance with the Harris nondisclosure agreement over its obligations to the court, the BPD took actions "detrimental to its position and inimical to the constitutional principles we revere." 118 The Andrews court at least had the opportunity to review the applicability of the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure doctrine to the use of stingray surveillance. In other cases, prosecutors have dropped cases rather than be forced to divulge any possible stingray use. In a 2014 case, prosecutors withdrew evidence in the robbery prosecution of Shemar Taylor rather than disclose information about how the BPD was able to gather information about the defendant's cellphone location. 119 And cases like Andrews's and Taylor's are not unique. Baltimore detective Emmanuel Cabreja testified in April 2015 that the department had used stingray surveillance 4300 times since 2007. Cabreja said that he personally had used a stingray device between 600 to 800 times in less than two years. 120 Other police departments have gone to similar lengths to avoid disclosing any information about possible stingray use. In 2014, Tallahassee police admitted to a judge that the department had used stingrays at least 200 times without informing the courts and without obtaining a warrant. 121 In 2015, prosecutors dropped more than a dozen charges against three defendants in a series of robberies in St. Louis, Missouri, the day before a St. Louis police officer was scheduled to testify about the suspected use of a stingray in the case. 122 In a similar case, a detective declined to specify how one of the defendants had been located and cited a nondisclosure agreement that bound the department. 123 While courts and lawmakers have begun to pay much more attention to police use of stingrays, that attention was made possible through investigative journalism, fortuitous circumstances, and defense attorneys' skepticism regarding vague references to tracking locations. In what may 117 Id. at 338. 118 
B. Accountability by Design
Police body camera video will only be useful if it exists in the first place. In a number of recent examples, body cameras failed to record shootings by the police because the officers involved failed to turn them on, 124 the cameras fell off, 125 or because the camera recorded images but no sound. 126 While these problems at first may seem to be matters of user error, they also illustrate how accountability can be embedded in surveillance technology design.
Consider the September 2016 fatal police shooting of Keith Scott, who was confronted by police officers in Charlotte, North Carolina. While the plainclothes officer who fatally shot Scott was not wearing a body camera, the uniformed officer who arrived at the scene was. Policies of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department required uniformed officers to turn on their body cameras "prior to" any investigative contact with civilians, but the uniformed officer did not turn his own on until some forty-five seconds after he arrived at the scene. 127 Right before the officer turned on his camera, its buffer mode recorded thirty seconds of video, but without any sound. 128 That video could not then confirm whether and how the officers on the scene had spoken to Scott, nor what they said, in the moments before shooting him.
In the Scott shooting, the failure to record was an accountability problem that was as much a design issue as it was human error. A differently designed camera might record a buffer with audio and video, or be activated when cruiser lights are on, 129 or even be turned on remotely. Yet when one company dominates the market for a surveillance technology, police department choices are constrained by a dominant company's choices. Many law enforcement agencies are well aware that they lack control over basic issues like body camera design and features. A common complaint noted in a 2015 survey of seventy large law enforcement agencies on body cameras stated that "[m]any technology decisions are largely being driven by vendor selection, rather than being driven by identified and articulated technical requirements." 130 When one company dominates the market for a surveillance technology, its choices about product design make important decisions about policing before the police themselves have an opportunity to do so. A police department considering a policy of surreptitious body camera recording in some instances may be pushed to adopt the tactic if the cameras they use incorporate stealth by design. Furthermore, if police departments, city councils, and state legislatures are slow to adopt regulations for body camera use-as is the case in many states 131 -then a dominant vendor's product design choices become the de facto policies for the police.
The largest vendor of police body cameras continues to make choices that influence policing and the legal limits of information collection. In February 2017, Taser acquired two companies that develop artificial intelligence to analyze stored video data. 132 By allowing the police to review stored data to look for objects, places, and actions, these tools encourage long-term rather than short-term data storage of body camera video, an issue that many police departments have not yet resolved. Finally, the prediction by Taser's CEO that its cameras will soon incorporate facialrecognition technology will mean that this policy decision-to match faces captured from a bodycam with an existing database-will likely be embedded in a surveillance technology before police departments or 129 Taser does offer a body camera that turns on whenever an officer turns on a Taser 
C. Outsourcing Suspicion and Obscuring Transparency
Police that rely on big data tools to identify those people and places that deserve attention are using these programs to help develop their own assessments about suspicion. These assessments in turn can help develop the legal suspicion necessary to conduct stops, frisks, and arrests. At some point in the near future, courts will have to determine whether an algorithm's determination can form the basis, at least in part, of Fourth Amendment suspicion. If informants and tips can help develop reasonable suspicion, it is likely that courts will accept big data analysis as another source of information for the police as well. 134 The problem for courts and defendants hoping to find out how a big data program has arrived at its conclusions is that the suspicion itself has been outsourced, at least in part. How an algorithm recommended police attention to one person or city block rather than another may be guarded as a "trade secret" that the algorithm's creators are unwilling to reveal.
While not a tool for developing police suspicion, defendants' experiences with TrueAllele software provide an instructive example. The software, developed by the Cybergenetics Corporation, promises to help identify suspects in cases where crime scene evidence commingles the DNA of multiple people, a situation that is often too difficult for conventional crime labs to resolve. 135 139 But an officer may unholster a firearm because of a black box score. By outsourcing the development of suspicion in part to surveillancetechnology vendors, police departments that contract for these services obscure the means by which they develop suspicion to investigate, make decisions about whether and how they might deploy limited resources, and influence individual officers in how they approach the public.
III MINIMIZING UNDUE INFLUENCE
New surveillance technology products are eroding traditional limits on policing like resource constraints and public visibility. 140 Stingrays, body cameras, and big data software vastly increase investigative powers for the police at low cost and in secret. The continuing influence of surveillance companies even after police have purchased their services further removes policing from traditional mechanisms of oversight.
There are few conventional means to address the influence of surveillance technology vendors on the police. As private companies, they are not subject to the same constitutional restraints imposed upon the police. Nor are they subject to federal or state records-request laws. Any proposals to address this undue influence, then, are not likely to look like the traditional means by which the police themselves are regulated. Instead, we can look at recent examples to identify some means that can increase 138 Rebecca Wexler argues further that the spread of automation and outsourcing of criminal justice data creates the erroneous impression that "the adversarial process is itself a business competition." See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System 61 (Apr. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920883. 139 See Skorup, supra note 102 (" [T] here is no mechanism for people to see their threat 'ratings'-much less why the algorithm scored it."). 140 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.").
transparency in these vendor-customer (i.e., company-police) relationships.
A. Local Surveillance Oversight
In many cases, surveillance technology companies fail to provide basic information about their products. While local communities are unlikely to be able to force private companies to disclose information, let alone discover the existence of such information, they can put pressure on local government to participate in the process through which their police departments acquire new surveillance technologies.
Some cities have begun this process. In 2013, Seattle became the first city to adopt a local ordinance requiring city departments to seek approval before the purchase of surveillance equipment. 141 The ordinance prohibits any department from installing or using surveillance equipment until the city council provides guidance on its use. That guidance must include an assessment of the technology's impacts on anonymity and privacy and propose steps to be taken to mitigate those impacts. The ordinance arose out of controversies in which the Seattle Police Department had acquired a drone and proposed using federal funds to establish a surveillance camera network. 142 In 2016, the County of Santa Clara, California, became the first in the nation to enact a similar ordinance that requires the sheriff and district attorney to seek approval from the county board of supervisors before obtaining new surveillance technology. 143 Law enforcement agencies are also required to provide the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors with an annual surveillance report which describes "how the surveillance technology was used, including whether it captured images, sound, or information regarding members of the public who are not suspected of engaging in unlawful conduct." 144 Also in 2016, the City of Oakland, California, created a nine-member Privacy Advisory Commission to guide the city's police on surveillance technology policies. 145 Public support for the commission arose out of the controversy surrounding a federal grant to develop a Domain Awareness 141 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.18.20 (2013). Catherine Crump explains the background of the ordinance in a detailed case study. See Crump, supra note 2, at 1605-16. 142 See Crump, supra note 2, at 1607-10 (noting the public backlash after the police department's failure to notify the city council of its drone acquisition). existence of stingray nondisclosure agreements.
Collecting and sharing the results of these records requests have spurred further investigation and interest in uncovering new forms and sources of police surveillance technologies. Organizations like MuckRock 153 and the ACLU, 154 for example, have collected and posted investigative reporting that documents stingray use and the release of stingray nondisclosure agreements entered into by local police departments. When collected and posted together, these nondisclosure agreements are strikingly similar.
Prolonged media interest in the existence of stingrays uncovered in part by these tactics has prompted lawmakers to investigate. In 2014 and 2015, Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy, both on the Senate Judiciary Committee, repeatedly asked the Department of Justice (DOJ) to disclose its policies and practices regarding stingray cellphone surveillance. 155 In their letters to the DOJ, Senators Grassley and Leahy cited media reports on the use of stingrays by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 156 
CONCLUSION
Stingrays, body cameras, and big data tools are likely to become as ubiquitous in policing as firearms, stun guns, and truncheons. As software through public reports, a government procurement database, and public records requests); Stingray Tracking Devices: Who's Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (identifying "72 agencies in 24 states and the District of Columbia that own stingrays" but noting that "because many agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of stingrays in secrecy, this map dramatically underrepresents the actual use of stingrays by law enforcement agencies nationwide"). 151 There are numerous examples of specific stingray nondisclosure agreements becoming known as a result of records requests by journalists. For instance, the Harris nondisclosure agreement with the Tucson Police Department was revealed pursuant to a records request made by journalist Mohamad Ali "Beau" Hodai. Zetter, supra note 31.increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies roll out at an everfaster pace, we should expect police departments to be eager to adopt them. The problem, however, is that as consumers in the surveillance technology marketplace, police departments are often at the mercy of surveillance technology vendors. This means that police are limited by whatever the surveillance technology market provides for them. Moreover, the interests of technology vendors in protecting their products add a layer of secrecy that is at odds with conventional norms of transparency and accountability in policing-at a time in which the public has become especially aware of the need for reinforcing these norms.
